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REPLY TO ELEONORE STUMP
Joshua Hoffman
Professor Stump raises many interesting and important issues in her comments
on my paper, "On Petitionary Prayer." In what follows, I shall address some of
these issues.
My reason for rejecting Argument A was that it attacks NC (my necessary
condition for the efficiency of petitionary prayer) in a misleading and confusing
way, viz., by means of a conditional ('God would have brought about s even if
one hadn't prayed for s') which in the context of the argument has an impossible
antecedent, but which we ordinarily read as if it had a contingent antecedent. I
did not mean to say that nothing in A poses a threat to NC; in fact, I said that
Argument A "perhaps does appeal to some sound intuition that if it is necessarily
true that God exists in the best of all possible worlds, then petitionary prayer is
incoherent." I then formulated Argument B, which attacks NC directly through
the assumption that God must create a unique optimal world. My strategy was
then to reply to Argument B (and, a jortoriori, to Argument A) by challenging
this assumption. Obviously, since Arguments A and B share this assumption, in
conceding that it threatens NC when employed in B, I was conceding that it does
so when employed in A. It was the confusing way that this assumption was used
in A that I objected to, and not the claim that that assumption poses a threat to NC.
Nevertheless, in the light of Stump's comments, I now think that my remarks
about Argument A do not clearly reflect my intended strategy, and may have
misled her into thinking that I was saying of A that nothing in it poses a threat
to NC. If she was misled in this way, then I am to blame, and I am grateful to
her for bringing this problem to my attention.
In her discussion of Argument A, Stump remarks that "Hoffman himself has
inadvertently been the source of much of the strength of his imaginary opponent's
position, because Hoffman simultaneously analyzes all counter-factuals in terms
of possible worlds and also allows his opponent assumption (a), which entails
that there is only one possible world." I cannot agree that I allow my imaginary
opponent (what Stump designates) assumption (a), since I spend a good deal of
time refuting that very assumption. If my refutation is sound, then both Argument
A and Argument B are disarmed, and the threat to condition NC is removed.
Yet Stump ignores my refutation of assumption (a). Instead, she suggests that
NC be reformulated in order to side-step the potential threat from assumption
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(a). Her suggestion is that NC be replaced with NC': "If a prayer for a state of
affairs, s, is efficacious, then if one hadn't prayed for s, God would not have
brought about s." But there are at least two difficulties with NC' . First, a complete
semantics for counter-factual conditionals is notoriously difficult to spell outwhich is why I resort instead to the terminology of possible worlds. Secondly,
it is highly doubtful that NC' does, in fact, assert a necessary condition for the
efficacy of petitionary prayer. On nearly all interpretations of counter-factual
conditionals, one with an impossible antecedent is necessarily true. On assumption (a), there is a unique best possible world which God necessarily creates.
Therefore, on this assumption, together with the assumption that in the best
possible world s is prayed for, the conditional which is the consequent of NC'
is necessarily true because its antecedent is impossible. And since its consequent
is necessarily true, NC' is necessarily true. Hence, NC' is consistent with assumption (a). But, surely, the efficacy of petitionary prayer is not consistent with
assumption (a). Thus, NC' does not state a necessary condition for the efficacy
of petitionary prayer. Stump can object that she does not accept the interpretation
of counter-factuals according to which those with impossible antecedents are
necessarily true. But then she owes us an alternative account of the semantics
of those counter-factuals and an explanation of why she rejects the standard
reading of them. These she does not provide. In any case, I maintain that there
is nothing wrong with NC. Stump thinks that there is something wrong with it
because it is incompatible with assumption (a). But any correct necessary condition for the efficacy of petitionary prayer must be incompatible with assumption
(a). It is assumption (a) which is mistaken.
Stump thinks that there is an easy way to refute Argument A (and afortoriori,
Argument B). She points out that assumption (a) is incompatible with "traditional
Christian theology," and she infers from this that "as an argument designed to
show an inconsistency in Christian belief, Argument A is not successful." This
inference is invalid, for assumption (a) might be entailed by other elements of
traditional Christian theology, e.g., by traditional views of God's power, goodness, and knowledge. Hence, an argument based on assumption (a) and designed
to show an inconsistency in Christian beliefs could be successful even if traditional
Christian theology explicitly or implicitly denies assumption (a), just so long as
other elements of traditional Christian theology entail assumption (a). A defense
of the possibility of efficacious petitionary prayer requires our showing that
God's goodness, power, knowledge, and necessary existence do not, despite
appearances, entail the necessity of a unique optimal world.
Apparently, Stump thinks otherwise, for at one point she asserts that I am
wrong to conclude that "the denial of this assumption [i.e., assumption (a)] is
required to defend the efficacy of petitionary prayer." Since Stump had just
argued that assumption (a) is incompatible with traditional theology, I am baffled
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as to how she thinks assumption (a) can at the same time be compatible with
the efficacy of petitionary prayer, when petitionary prayer is to be understood
in the context of traditional theology. Moreover, assumption (a) implies the
necessity of all events, something that seems to me to be obviously incompatible
with the efficacy of petitionary prayer. If Stump denies the latter assertion, then
she certainly owes us an argument in support of this denial. In fact, her only
argument in support of her claim that assumption (a) is compatible with the
efficacy of petitionary prayer is that assumption (a) does not entail that God
would have brought about s [a prayed for state of affairs which in fact God
brings about] even if no one had prayed for it. I have considered and challenged
this argument above.
I tum now to Stump's comments on my discussion of Argument C, a third
challenge to the possibility of the truth of condition NC which I dealt with in
my paper. Argument C assumes that God necessarily creates an optimal world,
and that in the actual world God brings about a prayed for state of affairs, s. It
infers from this that (1) God would have brought about s even if one hadn't
prayed for s, where this has the implication that (la) God brings about s in every
optimal world, i.e., in every possible world. My strategy is to attack this inference. Yet Stump thinks that I deny the implication from (1) to (la), and she
cites a reason which I am supposed to have given for doing so. But what she
cites is a reason given by me to deny that (1) can be inferred from the assumptions
that God necessarily creates an optimal world and that in the actual world God
brings about a prayed for state of affairs, s. It is not a reason given by me to
deny the implication of (la) by (1), which implication is something I stipulate.
Stump suggests that my Argument C could be recast in order to create a
stronger argument posing a greater threat to the efficacy of petitionary prayer.
She proposes dropping my condition NC in favor of a different necessary condition, borrowed, she reports, from William Alston. This is the condition that
"God brings about a prayed for state of affairs s as a reply to the prayer for s,"
where 'as a reply to' means: that God is influenced to do s by a person T's
prayer p, that God does s in light of T's prayer p, and that God does s in order
to respond to T's prayer p. But as far as I can tell, this condition is not weaker,
rather it is stronger, than NC. It seems to me, in other words, that if Stump's
recast Argument C were a stronger argument against the efficacy of petitionary
prayer than Argument C, then the necessary condition upon which the recast
Argument C rested would be weaker than NC (assuming NC to be correct); at
least, that condition would not entail NC. Yet it seems to me that Stump's
necessary condition not only entails NC, it is not entailed by it. Therefore, it
seems to me that Stump's recast Argument C is a weaker argument against the
efficacy of petitionary prayer than my Argument C.
Stump describes the recast Argument C as "like the argument against prayer,
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which I presented in my paper on prayer." Let us call the argument in Stump's
paper Argument D. Stump believes that this argument presents a challenge to
petitionary prayer by relying upon the following reasoning: "Surely a perfectly
good God could not be influenced to one or another course of action by the fact
that some human being prays for it. To put it crudely, if the state of affairs
prayed for is bad, a perfectly good God could not bring it about. And if the
state of affairs prayed for is good, a perfectly good God will bring it about just
because it is good, not because some creature has petitioned for it." It is not
completely clear what this argument comes to, because it is not completely clear
what Stump means by a "good" or a "bad" state of affairs. One plausible interpretation of a "good" state of affairs is one which is such that when the ratio of its
intrinsic goodness to evil and the ratio of the goodness to evil it causes are added
together, on balance the goodness outweighs the evil. A "bad" state of affairs
would be defined in a parallel fashion. Let us suppose that this is Stump's
meaning. The problem raised by Argument D is this: how can the traditional
God answer a prayer for something that is bad, or fail to bring about something
good whether or not it is prayed for? And Stump's reply is that God sometimes
answers prayers for bad things and sometimes fails to answer prayers for good
things, because his doing so is necessary for a good which outweighs the evils
permitted or the goods foregone. This good, she says, is divine/human friendship.
As Stump said in her paper on prayer ("Petitionary Prayer"), (what I have called)
Argument D is like the argument from evil: how can a perfectly good God permit
evil or forego goodness? And Stump's solution of the problem parallels the free
will defense by pointing to some hitherto unnoticed source of overbalancing
goodness in the very process by means of which certain evils are permitted and
certain goods foregone. The overbalancing goodness derives from divine/human
friendship, and the process is the efficaciousness of prayer.
I have no doubt that if Stump's claims that (i) God's permitting the efficacy
of petitionary prayer is necessary for divine/human friendship, and (ii) divine/
human friendship is a source of goodness, were plausible and well-supported,
then her attempt to solve the problem posed by Argument D would succeed.
But there are two questions I want to raise about Stump's attempt to solve this
problem. First, is her attempt successful in its own right? And secondly, is it
the only possible solution to the problem? As to the first question, I argued in
my paper that claim (i), at least, is not plausible or well-supported. Stump did
not reply to my arguments to that effect, and I still think that these arguments
raise serious doubts about Stump's solution. As to the second question, I believe
the answer to it is also negative. My reply to Argument C showed that while a
prayer for state of affairs s may be good, because the not obtaining of s may be
equally good, God's failure to answer the prayer for s may not result in any net
loss of goodness. In giving this reply, I did not assume that the efficacy of prayer
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injected any additional element of value into the situation-I did not assume that
its efficacy was "worth" anything. Yet my reply to Argument C is also an
effective reply to Argument D. How can God not answer a prayer for something
good? Because it may be that his not answering it results in a world that is
equally good, the presence or absence of the thing prayed for being morally on
a par. Hence, it seems to me that Stump is wrong when she says in her comments
on my paper that I haven't taken up (and by implication, haven't met) "the
strongest objection" being put by Argument D. I would maintain that my response
to Argument C is a better reply to Stump's Argument D than is her own, since
it isn't committed to what I think is the implausible contention that the efficacy
of petitionary prayer is necessary for divine/human friendship.
Obviously, Professor Stump and I remain in disagreement about some of the
issues surrounding the problem of the compatibility of the efficacy of petitionary
prayer and divine goodness. I would like to say, though, that hers is the groundbreaking paper with respect to this problem which inspired my own modest
efforts to solve the problem.
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

